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IN 'l.'HE SHADOvr OF VIET NAM

Commenceme~t

Address by

Se~e.tor

.. ike Mansfie!d (D . , Y.or;ta.-:a)

Haverford Co::ege, Haverford, Pennsylvania
Tt:.eseay, ?·~ay 30, 1967, 11 : 00 A . M.

It is
time

~o

doub~ful ~he.t ~here

graduate from college .

There

has ever been a good

1~

only an inevitable time

If you have a sense of concern as to

and you have arrived at it .

the future, i -c may be some,·:ha t reas s~ri::;g
1~ee1.:ng ~-il'".ich

as anyone

has bee!l

s:~ared

~o

by graO. ...

note that it is a
~--~s~s

as far back

ca~ re~e~~er .

unco:r.mon concern
cirCU."l1Stances .

1;:1e

abou.~

~·u-:.~re .

You grad\4£. ... e in '...... ..... o:nmon

You "'·ralk out directly into tn..., snadm·: o.t Viet

Nam .
Since that is the case, you are not likely to have
much ir:terest in \·:ha ~
c1...'t there 11 •
--nthra1led by

~

:n.ig!'lt say about the job opportun:. 'ties

;or do : be::.eve -:.hat you
co:-::.~er:-:.s

on :1edicare,

'I.!O

ld be especially

high~·:ay

beautification,
I

•
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antipoverty programs, the peace corps or a dozer. or more
crea~ive

o~her

and useful legis::..ative enterprises '·:hich have been

initiated in

recen~

years by the federal government .

I expect that '\Jhat you expec1; from me is to make
some sense on the question of Viet Nam--on the l'rar and its prospects and your prospects in the light of it .

I do not know that

I can live up to those expectations if \•:hat you seek is a punchcard computation of satisfying

I do no-.; have that sort

a.ns\•re:.~s.

of information a."ld I do no-c knm·T

~01·:

'to run i:.he computers .

As

one Senator, I have only 'the personal es'C:..,:ates and a·.. _tudes
Hhich come from a long effort to
in the problems of Viet

Na~ a~d

t:;.~y

Asia .

to understand \'That is involved
I have only the concerns

which I share with young people as to their personal future in
the light of this persisting difficulty .

I have only an awareness

of the curi:.c..in of U..'1certainty 't·!hich Viet N'am has dra'm across the

I

- 3 pursu~t

of happiness

~~ ~his

t~e p~o~pects

nation and

for con-

tL"'lued civilized su:::-v!.va: eve:::-y..;rhere in the l:orld .
~=~

o:

the United

resolution of the co'!:.::'::.ct

-!'l

V:!..et Na ..

On the

Sta~es,

~·:!.11

the

eve~tual

depend greatly

the President and the Executive B1·anch of the government .
,;ill, also, depend in part on Senators ar..d Congressmen .
las.., a."'lalysis, hoPeve:::-,

1·~

o~

It
In the

l'n:a C.epend hea.v __ y or. trre people o::-

the nation a.."'ld, _n pa.:::-ticu:G.::r;; on the raacl:.:.c.. of you."'lg pe::rsons
such as

yourselv~s

sit\:a""Cion .

to

art rele'.'ant and you have

r~o7.

Yom· op.:.nio!'l.s on Viet

I~am

only a rig!'lt but, if you are so

inc:..:!.:ned, a public du-:.y -co expre_s them .
an obligation to ask; you have a

You a:s.::> have, ho'l:ever,

respor.sioili~y

to listen and these

are antecedent to 'the responsible exercise of your right and duty
'tO speak.

In

-ho.z:~,

yo'J. o·.-1e it -.::o yourselves, "CO your country

ar.d to the vital:!..-.::y of

~he

i~st:.tutions

~~

\~ich

to me.!::e your op_nions as ::_"'!fo:::med as possible .
contr:.buting

so~eth:!..r.g

to

~ha"t e~d,

you have

~~tured

!:1 'the hope o::

-make these remarks -coday .
I

- 4 The
th t at

t~

es

-~

Vie~

. ~am '1. ·ar has been so o:'te:n in -cr.e ::;,e,:s

see~s ~ha~

note h ....... happenea :.n
bardment from -.;he

:or several years nothing else of
e have had an

-:;!"~e \:"o~~:d .

coF..::u.~ica-c;ions

?r.edia .

incessar~~ ~o~-

.:e have been exposed.

to the horrors and the heroics and to the destruction and the
dedication of this

wa:~ .

\•!e have had almozt a curfei t

conflic-c is illusive and. ::. "'Cs
known the frustrat:.o;-:

··---\.;·-

--;.....;

sou nt peace in an ever
!t
a balanced

vie~·;

-~

pt!.rpo~es

co~es

~ere

of :'acts

remaL"l obscure.

from an ever

mo~e

He

ha·.~e

i:n"'Ce::;.se:y

intensely fought war.

~s dif~icult

in these

circumst~"lces

to

~ain~a~

Indeed, t:-re

oi the conflict or our role in it .

Vietna-:nese conflict is as a pm·1erful drug which has been ad ministered to the lL"!':e::-icz...! body polit!.c.
individu ls has

oea~

out to get out.

For

The ef'fec-c o:: so!::e

o:' a heady stimula."lt; they 'llroulC. go all
-che~ -c~e

to pull out the s-cop:per

a..~d

solu"'Cion to this

gri~ conf:~c-c

let 1 ... have a l-lhopper .

1

~

is

respec"t
/

- 5 r

"C..o.,e~ ·:he ...re so inc ... ned, to expre.,.,

o

ci
.,o 't.

o_

w

S"Co

rewtra:~"C~

even to the ext nt of

cal-L~g

d_ss~Y:t

:f'!'o_.

for a

~eturn

- .0 e, b:!t : a: so tr.ost respectfully di..,agree wi -.::. t.hc:;: .

•.e honorable '!'oad ou-c of Vi....t Nrun is not one ".rhich leads
more deeply into

eve~

.. aesirablc end to the uar in Viet

.~sia .

r-r~

is

not to be found by exter1<iing -che battlefie:!.d.., to the rest of South-

:t is, or ought to be, crystal c.:ear to all

c st Asia ru.a -:o China .
by thiw
on

lat~

aa'te,

-cha~ ~~

he . .,ian ..ainlar.d,

is

b~t

ve~

easy to expand this

involve~ent

·.:hat it is immensely di:ff:cul-c

~o

con-

tr ct it .
I co

no~ ~elieve

that the

circumstance~ c~

this

conflict have generated ar.y great enthusiasm :for expansion of the
•.. ar.

Rather they !:"lave inC.uced a deep concern as to its extent

c.nd the elusi•.rcmess of i-;;s conclusion .
bee

u~e

it is

_n

fact is tha-c -;;he

..,ociety ere

acco~pa~~ed

cha~gec.

;:8.!'

by a silent

oe-:.rilders .

It is no less a concern
accepta~ce

of its g'!'eat costs .

The sensitivi ties

o~

Figures totaling billions of dol:e.rs

our
~end

I

o

0

not
!'sona
-v:e

~~terested.

-ra:v.:.o~s,

~

e

~on-~houg~-.;

Unie~s a~:ectea

-.:;_.E:!

r

.:.~-Y

a~

~h

re

n:::ess~n

-

0

Clomes-r.:.c

p~ob::.e ... s

.~ educa-A~t-_
. run., · o..

ess

O-

2 o.:.:.lio:;_ a n:onth, or

2.7 billion per
Certainly a

a..'l'ld

mo~th o~

more

~han

directly

casua:-vy counts
1ar morn.:.n

cup

by

re accep-.:.ed
o~

co~fee.

1;0

co~sigY:l

1;o e.

other issue ... o_

i'O:!.'eig~

policy .

In 1; 1e ...,)roY.T-n.., demand"' of ·.1ar there is a

l_.bo

s .:.n a spor.,

~, .... ndency

the mo•• e .... ary costs of

V .:.e-'.:;

2. :,illion annUt-:..-Y .. to

32 bill.on annually.

'igure of $25 o.:.llion for a year gives some !'easonab_e

.:.ndicE:.t on of the

cur:.~e~t

ra-:e of spendir.g for th ....

w~:: .

is
Keep

a f_gure, moreover, i:;hat is not going c!o'.m; it is t;oi..z up.
in mind, more:ov .... :r, -::hat I am speaking only of the cost of ou:r
.~l.:.tary ef~ort

in

V~et

Nam .

That

~epresents

only about a

t~~~d

o:.... ou: ann.l""l defense ex.per:d.: -~,ures of ove: ;:p70 billion.
4

I
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_...

25 :..:llion

~.o

re

co .pared 1:ith t:.e

~s

o~ ~he

On the basis

:--equ. . sts ·...., .ranu ry "or the co:r.ir.g fiscal

year :~

Fourtee.r.. ueeks of 't.'ar t:Xpenditure.., in Viet Kam
\':ou:d fu..-;d a:.:. f..,aera: tran ..:portat ...or.

a.>'!.d

~!"!e c.e~re~op..ent OJ.'

o,)uc..

l.t..._.

ra.ilroaC. and co ....uter service
passe:.-.ge!'

v

.... ..,

proposals :~

- --t:-1-

speed

u.na t. e s..:.perso!"!:.c

ai~:pla.~e;

A yea!' 1 s cost o..:'

v~te_·an ....

1

bene_ .J..ts and ;:;;erv:.ces

gro;ring out of all :past wars could be met with 12
~leeks

of cUl·rent \'!ar expenditures in Viet ?!am;

Eight 'K eeks of m... lit ...ry e:;.:p nses in

all

o~

the

elerr.en~a~,

~ederal

.onie

seconaary, hi

v.:.e~

sou ht for

er,

Na."'!

e~ual

educa~:c~ --

voca~io;.al ~~c

/

- 8 -

o_·

~he

:federal cover... nt,

nclu -.1g s_ut't clea!"a.r.ce

and o·c:1e:..· efforts to rr.a.{C the na.tio.. 1 s cities sai'er
c.o.'!:d r:Io!"e sati::>f'ying pl....ce .. for h'w .. a.n

a'oi~atio~

rep::.·ese:::"'C 6 1:eeks of the co ...t o · the Vl.e1;na:mese 1·:ar;

The e!!-::.:·e Food _·or

~e

.ce pro0 r

. thich :'eeds

t .. e eq_;..::ivale?:·c o:- :ess than 4 l'lee.~s

i.·.ar costs

in Vie-c

'!:·he international activities in which we participa:ce
for the purposes of

hu.~nitarian

more s vab ... e peace, car. ·;:)e

c...nd econor.1ic goals and above a::l, a

expre~sed

in s.:.mila: stark

co~-.;::.~as·cs .

':'he

nu 1 level o:' U. S. appropr ..:.a.tion ... , for exa...ple, 1'or the in-ce!"rican .lllie.nce :or ?:-o;::-ess- - much of

'.:nic~

is repayable,

I

- 9 -

s: ou-: 6 ueeK.s o \: ...r-eo:::~ ......n
t-

.a-..

ved

"'t•• -'t ....,

V~et

.•

ne aed red ..tr -~Ution

One
0 ~

farm land

Ina:a, Pa..<!.s·.. a."'l, the coas'tal ureas of Asia,
co\.lla be

~r~ca,

••

brou~·-t

con:::'!scation, :~o".!' about $5 'bill on o" total cos\..

"'0

ould be tht eouivalent o: 10 \ieeks o.P

ent r

. _.., .. _o

about equ: ......bly at"'ld

wffi

.w

~:...r

T:-:.at

xp""nd.: -curen in V!.et

ua.: U.S. Co.·r.:ri.bUtHm to t .. e r ' ular buag€t ._. d "CO all

_n

'th~

•• ad:e East, C 'J)ru .. ar.d e .... sel·.here co...~ ... to 80 hours

o: 3 days o ...' war

ex_,end..:t~·es

?na .. i;he grea-:

ou.., shift.:.ng the economy

~co

in Viet ,ra ..
burde~

of Viet . arr.

~as

bee-::.

~et

;;it:'1 -

a ;..u..rtime footing a."ld \·Ti th surprisingly

:.:.t't-e _nf_a\:.ion is a commentary on the vital_ty o_' the !'le:c:.o!1 1 S
prod ....c-cive f:c.ci ......:Les.

th

Pre~iden-c

ov~rn

an

.ent's ro.

:t

is also a tr.i.bute to

~he

skill vr:..::'h wh::.ch

.. :.s ..dministration hc.ve cor.duc1;ed the federal
~ ~~e

nation's econom_c ana fiscal affairs .

I

..
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iteverthel.ess, it would be pointless to ignore the
prospect of a converga."lce of

~actors

\\'hich may require us to accept

controls and higher taxes or alternatively, to suffer a serious and ,
in the end, destructive inflation .

We are approaching the point

'where growing needs in VietNam are beginning to draw significant
nUmbers of skilled workers out of civilian production into military
service and defense industries.

At the

s~e

time , there is no

corresponding decr ease in the demand for consumer goods .
the gap in part,

~e

To fill

import in great er a"ld greater quantities and

this process, in turn, leads to growing complications and difficulties in the balance of payments .
Whatever the economic implications, however, the
fundamental tragedy of Viet Nam lies not so much in those considerations as in the toll

o~ h~"l

life and hope .

Already the over- all

casualties are more than one- third that of the Korean war .

"

...

q,.,

~f:RO

.,, uo
I

r •
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It is grim to speak of

suffering by way of

h~~an

statistics, yet some numerical comparisons are necessary if "'e
are to understand the di mensions of Viet Nam .

In the first three

weeks of April, for example, 518 Americans were killed in action .
&"VV'-

These young men joined

I cI

nea~£y

coo
9,Q00 others who have lost their

lives since U. S . troops were committed to Viet Nam.

So far the

number of young Pennsylvanians alone who have been killed in Viet
Nam is about equal to the entire student body of Haverford College .
c...~

In addition to the dead, there have been
~~ericans

wounded in Viet Nam.

f,C.,otx

5~

To give this

some sense of the pain it has entailed, note that it would be the
equivalent if every man , woman and child in the city suffered an
injury in some sudden and appalling disaster in Haverford .
The civilian analogy is apt because in addition
to the military casualties which have occurred, the war in Viet
Nam infl i cts great pain on those who are caught up in its crossfires and in the incredibly brutal fury which characterizes intraVietnamese political rivalries and hatreds .

,,

Major General James
0

I

- 12 -

director

H~~phreys,

o~

our public health efforts in Viet

Na~,

recently estimated that 50,000 civilians would be treated for
'\·:ar-related injuries in govermnent hospitals in South Viet
this year .

~{a.":l

Of course , this figure says nothing of the countless

deaths, accidental and unreported which are induced by military
action .

It says nothing of the political murders and mutilations .

It says nothing of the countless injured vrho go untreated in a
land of limited and, in many areas,
The

hosti~e

non - exis~nt

medical services .

military forces against whom we a r e

pitted have also been hard hit .

Official sources list the com-

bined total of North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong killed in action
in South

V~et

Nam as 149, 000 fo r 1966, with weekly totals at times

this year in excess of 2,000 .

These figur es ar e i ndicative of the

great destructiveness of the repertoire of modern weapons ,.,.hich
I

has been drawn upon fo r use in Viet Nam .

Yet, enemy fo r ces continue

the struggle and actually , a r e growing in numbers .

The latest

I
0

- 13 Pentagon figures show enemy s~rength at record levels--287 , 000
today as compared to 239 , 000 a year ago .

This increase is in the

face of an estimated loss of half- million in the war to date .
~

\~at

was , scarvcely two years ago, preponder antly

a war among Vietnamese has now become preponderantly wa r between
hostile Vietnamese and U. S . forces .

The total number of Amer ican

ground forces in Viet Nam went from 45,000 in 1965 to 4oo, ooo by
the end of 1966.

It is

L~

the neighborhood of 450 , 000 today and

there is talk, even now, of the need for an additional Marine
division and one or two additional army divisions .

The prospect

~~e

of an increaseAbeyond 500 , 000 by the end of this year is not to be
dismissed .

This prospect , in fact , is enhanced
by the r ecent
,,

consignment of new responsibilities to the U. S . military command
in the work of pacification and the possibilities of the expansion
of the U. S . military effort into the delta regions of the

Me~ong .

United States forces having replaced the Saigon armies as the
principal combatant on the front lines in the North and West of

I
0

- 14 South Viet Nam may now be on the Ttlay to becoming the major military
element in the Southern sector and the rear areas .

This delta

region and the work of pacification have heretofore been consigned
to the South Vietnamese authorities working in concert with a few
&~erican

civilian and military advisors .
'\ ·

There is currently, coincident with these changes,
some expression of views from "anonyptous" but "official sources"
that a military victory is just around the corner and that it can
finally be achieved by another new input of American forces and
effort .

The same feeling, however , it should be noted, has been

present in the past, prior to significant new inputs or usages of
U.S . military power .

And after each added military step, I regret

to note the forecasts of an imminent resolution of the conflict
have ceased .
I think it is to be anticipated that the process of
increasing the U.S. military role in installments will go on, but
in my judgment the search for a decision by force of arms will be
as elusive as the quest for a just solution by diplomatic negotiaI
0

tions has so far proved to be .

- 15 In

short, the prospects for a restoration of peace

in the near future are not at all encouraging.

We will do well to

face, now, the fact that enormous risks lie ahead on the present
military course.

The prospect of a direct military conflict with

China obviously is somewhere along the path of an expanding war
in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia .

It is not important that, as a

matter of policy, we do not wish to threaten Chinese interests on
the Asian mainland and have so stated many times. What is important
are the implications of our growing military effort in Viet Nam as
seen through the spectacles of Chinese xenophobia .

The cosmic

gyrations of the Chinese "cultural revolution" are indicative of
the immense enigma which China poses for our policies .

It is not

safe to assume, with any degree of assurance, what may be the
eventual result of this great political upheaval in China .

It

may mean a more militant China; it by no means guarantees a less
militant China .

Insofar as we are concerned, there is no reason

to expect as a consequence of the inner struggle any reduction in
Chinese suspicion of us or any remission in the hostility with
J
0

- 16 which they have regarded our course in Viet Nam from the beginning .
Th:s response to us , in Viet

Na~ ,

it should be noted, has its roots

at least as much in Chinese history and tradition as in Chinese
ideological theory .
To reiter ate , the Chinese r esponse to us in Viet
Nam will be little affected by current developments in China, in
the absence of other changes in the situation .

In any event , there

are signs that the ideological fury within that immense nation has
begun to abate .

Chinese fo r eign trade has not been cut by the

action of the Red Guards although it may suffer from the curr ent
'

Hong Kong unrest .

.

So far as anyone is aware the nuclear project

in Lop Nor continues to operate at full blast in the we•$• n deserts
of Sinkiang .

Most important in its implications for Viet Nam, the

Chinese-Soviet conflict has been put aside at least sufficiently
to permit Soviet military supplies for Hanoi to flow unimpeded
overland through China .

I

- 17 There is some tendency to dismiss the

ChL~ese

as a significant factor in the considerations which should be given
our course in Viet Nam .

A preoccupation with the possibilities of

a U.S.-Chinese clash is regarded in some quarters as unwarranted,
to say the least .

The view is that the Chinese dragon, out of

preoccupation or prudence , will bellow but not bite .

It would be

well to recall that similar sentiments were expressed in connection
with Korea.

Indeed , they

~ere

expressed in a kind of whistling in

the dark even after the initial reports began to come in that the
Chi nese had crossed the Yalu and clashed with U. S . forces in the
far North .
Since my memory goes back that far, I hope you will
forgive me if I reiterate that the prospect of war with China
emerging from the Vietnamese conflict cannot be dismissed .

And

I hope you will forgive me if I reiterate, too, what I reported on
~?"-' ' f:;..
re~urning from Viet N~~ ~ years ago .
I said then and I repeat
now :

~he

war in Viet Nam

~

open-ended and the end is not in sight .

I
0

..
- 18 One of the most significan 4 statements of General
the able soldier who

com~nds

the

-~eeks

visit in this country· a 'f'e-.,;
.in Viet N.am ts not in sight.

~.s.

West~oreland,

forces in Viet Nam, on his

ago, •·:as that an end of the

~'.'ar

Presumably he meant a military

termination of the war .

That '(;as the sober opinion of a soldier

on a matter in which his

professio~~l

a special

comoetence gives his opinion

si~ificance .

In the light of General Hestmorela."ld 1 s estimate,
it ;·:ould seem to me to be prude!lt.) as I have stated! to anticipate
a"l enlargement of the war in

Vie~

Nam .

Yet I do not wish to suggest

that the war will inevitably escalate to.,sards a grim infinity .

I

have suggested on occasion the possibility of limiting the military
conflict, so long as it must persist, to South Viet Nam.
the rationale for the

bo~bing

Indeed,

of the North can be eliminated on

the basis of a defensive military bar=ie= on the ground, south of
the 17th parallel .

That could do whet aerial bombing of the North

\·:as expected to do but has not done, namely, interdict the lines
of supply and

..

1>0

co~~unication

between north and south V'et

~am.

X[I>O
ro~v

~'

uo

I'"

..

- 19 Sen~tor

John Sherman Cooner, of Kentucky , recently asked that the

bombing in the iorth be limited to these supply routes and that,
too. is a step towards linitin

~ar .

In the end, hov;e·;-er, negot · ations alone can supply
a sure and perme.nent limitation or termination of the conflict .
In the end , a way must be
That •.;ould be a peace

fo~~d

.,.,..~ich

elusi\·e military triumph .

to negotiate an honorable peace .

is not soug."lt on the basis of an

Rather it

~muld

be a peace grounded

in the orir.ciple that the rights of the Vietnamese people are
paramount in this situation.
which are at stake .

Indeed~

It is their country and their future
that is

th~

principle which President

Johnson, Ho Chi Minh and all others concerned have contended is
the basis for the current milit ·y cf orts .

The pr oblem is how

to initiate negotiations •·:h::..ch :n · ght lead to a common concept of
the principle and

a~ree-e~t

on means by which it is to be put into

practice .

•

xcno

.

-. uo

..
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The effort to open negotiations to end the
been so far an exercise in

co~ple te

frustration .

felt~

along with many others, for

ex~mple ~

has

Countless pro-

posals have been advanced and thev have come to naught .
long

~ar

I have

that the proper

. vehicle
for "Oeace
talks ..:.s t h e Gcne·1a Conferences .
.
.

These con-

ferences brought the war in Indo- China to an end in 1954 and in

1962, produced a treaty '·:hich, \':h1.tever its shortcomings, did
return a measure of peace to a Laos on .t he verge of collapse.
Tne Geneva Conference has the merit of being recognized not only
by North Viet Na'll, but by China.
pants to face up to their

Getting the Conference partici-

res"Oons ib il~ti es~

however, is another

matter .
I have also sought to have greater attention given
to the views General de Gaulle and Cambodia' s Prince Norodom
Sih~~ouk

and U Thant and I have advocated a meeting between

Secretary of State Dean Rusk
~~~

a ll-Asian

co~ference

a~d

of friend

China ' s fore ign minister, Chen Yi.
~~d

f oe alike has also been

,, '

..
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propo::.ed as an elaborat:.on of lart year's ll.antla meet·.ng.

I have

urged that the br!.ef cease-fires wh · ch ,.,.e have seen during holiday
per· ods in Viet Nam be extended and coupled ;..·i th a military '' sta."ld~ast 11

on land, sea and air as a prelude to nep:otiations . I have
V.f~
suggested that South Viet N~m's borders be inspecte~by the threenation International Control
~Tien

Co~~ission.

it became

diplomacy had failed to open up
urge last fall a.

for~al

app~re~t

~

that traditional secret

road to negtiations, I began to

and open U. N. contribution to the effort to

re::.tore peace should be sought.

1T'th all due respect to U Thant,

the dedicated Secretary-General, yhe U.N. as an organization has yet
tc face up to the responsibilities

~·rhich

are imposed by this situat!.on .

I do not think anyone expects miracles from that
or~""l~~~tion

but I do think that all memb0rs of the U.N. have an

obligation to make a concerted contr:bution through its machinery
to the search "or peace .

It ';·i'-'.::.-d appear to me to be most appropriate,

for example, for the Security Council to issue a call by formal
resolution to all \\'ho are directly or indirectly engaged in Viet !ram- -

"

XERO

,.

'

)<

FlO

C"O 'Y

ff'

~,

..
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member and non-member of the U.N. alike--to confer in 1:ew Yorit
or Geneva.
ways and

A confrontation of positions

me~~s

to restore oeace

order and it is urgent .

n Viet

~~d

a

consideratio~

of

in this fashion is

N~~

I do not know whether it

i~ould

i~

be effective

But I see no reason ,.,hy it should not be attempted or why this
nation should not take a strong in'tiative in connection there•.dth .

..!) ,..<A.:...d ~fi.. o-n- ~ Ol...nt A-A"A..r-<'7'A.A..~...R.:::tx,,, #--.r -J.L. ~~~ .. ~..o ""'<f.
~ ~ 4~rf·~~~ .,~
In v:.e•·: of the grim esti:nate of the Viet r·am. -..;ar,

;·;hich I have just given you, you may be as'k-ing at this moment :
11

1t:here do I come in or , :pcrhc. ,. ,

when does he get out?"
p~~ch-card

do I get out , or, perhaps,

As I tcld you at the outset , I do not have

answers, e:.ther for the war in Viet Nam or in terms of

its personal implications .

For you, thn concern is di r ect .

draft is already an important considerat'.on i n your life .
concern for ending the conflict needs to
pro"olems of the dra!'t ,
The i:tplicat.:.ons of a
~d

i~portant

run - a~;ay

r-

+hat

beyond the
:nay

be to each

The
But

i~~ediate

individ~al .

·:ar_. ..,.:ith full Ch'nese involve:nent

even Russla at a later stage

~re

s aggering to contemplate .

-

?

·en l'ithout a great expa.."'lsion, the :aves of additional thousands
s nnd

0

~

As:a.."'ls~

both

ry and civilian, are forfeit,

~i

··e do "'lot achieve a.."1 end to this conflict in the near

f~ture .

The well-being of the U. S . economy, ;hich is, after all the underp · nnin~

~

our

1n

Arnc.tional po

of hu."'la..'1ism . if not of hw-a.'1.,;,.ty

!I

t

~,

o.t stake .

The surv·· \·al

is increasingly

thro~n

nto doubt as the pers:stence of the uar induces the removal of
re tra· nts and an e·1en greate;:- callousness to human

As graduates, you have a
... ··ell

"S

a special ccnc"' n.

respon~ibility

to try to

~"'lderctand

pe~ce.

'rmy norsons have been

nr · c ns and
b en

~ore·

Good

Much

ha~

It is

a.'1d to contribute to the
rn~y

be left unturnE"d in

happened since Dien Bien Phu .

involved--Comm~.mists

gners, DemocrP.t

intent~or.s

ng .

responsibility

It is larger than protest .

understo.."'lding of others so that no stone
the search for

s~ec~al

suffer~

and non - Com:nu.'1ists,

and Repub ·cans .

have · en disto

4

~P

·~istakes

have

At this late date,

4-he ouestion is not ''v:ho got us here anci ;-;hy?'' but ''where do ·...-e go
~ro:n

here and ho·,.;?"

X "0
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In

connect~on

thcre;.:ith, I hope that. I have at

least made the point that as one

~~erican ,

as one Senator, I

bel.ie·.-e without reservatio::. that it is in the interests of the
United States and all others involved in Viet Nam and the ;.:orld to
·scale do;.m these hostilities as quickly as possible .

I believe it

is in the common interest to get to the conference table without
delay , to bring this

~o;ar

to an

honor~ble

end and to begin using

the i:nmense energy and resou:::-ces \·;h · ch are no.,.: preempted by the
conflict for the constructive works of peace .

I

.

Olt)

